Suppose we are given a proof of knowledge P in which a prover demonstrates that he knows a solution to a given problem instance. Suppose also that we have a secret sharing scheme S on n participants. Then under certain assumptions on P and S, we show how to transform P into a witness indistinguishable protocol, in which the prover demonstrates knowledge of the solution to a subset of n problem instances corresponding to a quali ed set of participants. For example, using a threshold scheme, the prover can show that he knows at least d out of n solutions without revealing which d instances are involved. If the instances are independently generated, this can lead to witness hiding protocols, even if P did not have this property. Our transformation produces a protocol with the same number of rounds as P and communication complexity n times that of P. Our results use no unproven complexity assumptions.
Introduction
In this work 1 , we assume that we are given an interactive proof where the prover P convinces the veri er V that P knows some secret. Typically, the secret is the preimage under some one-way function of a publicly known piece of information. Thus the secret could be for example a discrete log or an RSA root. Such a proof is called a proof of knowledge 5] , and can be used in practice to design identi cation schemes or signature systems.
We assume in the following that the proof of knowledge has a special form in that the veri er only sends uniformly chosen bits. This is also known as a public coin protocol. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to 3-round protocols, where the prover speaks rst (generalization of our results to any number of rounds is possible). We also assume 1. Introduction that the protocol is honest veri er zero-knowledge, i.e. the protocol does not reveal anything (for example about the prover's secret) to the honest veri er, but it is not necessarily secure against a cheating veri er.
Numerous protocols are known to satisfy the conditions described above. Concrete examples are Schnorr's discrete log protocol 12] and Guillou-Quisquater's RSA root protocol 8] . None of these protocols are known to be zero-knowledge or even witness hiding. In general, a parallelization of a sequential zero-knowledge proof 7] will often satisfy the conditions.
The second ingredient we need is a secret sharing scheme, i.e. a scheme for distributing a secret among a set of participants such that some subsets of them are quali ed to reconstruct the secret while other subsets have no information about it. The collection of quali ed subsets is called the access structure. The secret sharing scheme has to satisfy some properties which will be made more precise below. Shamir's secret sharing scheme 13] has the properties we need.
Our main result uses a proof of knowledge P, an access structure ? for n participants, and a secret sharing scheme S for the access structure dual to ? to build a new protocol, in which the prover shows that he knows some subset of n secrets. More precisely, we x a correspondence between secrets and participants in ?, and P shows that he knows a set of secrets corresponding to a quali ed set in the access structure of ? (see Section 3 for details on access structures). The protocol is witness indistinguishable, i.e. the prover reveals no Shannon information about which quali ed subset of secrets he knows.
As a corollary, we obtain a general method for improving the security of honest verier zero-knowledge protocols. Of course, honest veri er zero-knowledge is a weak property, and it is much easier to design protocols that are honest veri er zero-knowledge, than to get more general security properties. On the other hand, honest veri er zeroknowledge is not in itself su cient for use of the protocol in practice. For practical use, we would need at least a witness-hiding protocol, where it can be shown that whatever the veri er learns will not help him to compute the prover's secret.
This problem would be solved if we had a general method for transforming the honest veri er zero-knowledge protocol into a protocol with stronger security properties. From our results, a transformation follows that constructs witness-hiding protocols. Although witness-hiding is a weaker property than zero-knowledge, it can replace zero-knowledge in many protocol constructions, including identi cation schemes. Our transformation preserves the round complexity, increases communication complexity by a factor of two and will not need any computational assumptions. Our results can therefore be seen as giving a general method simplifying the design of witness-hiding protocols.
After surveying related work, we give in the following two sections more details on the protocols and the secret sharing schemes we consider. Section 4 then contains the main result and corollaries, Section 4.1 gives some concrete examples, and Section 5 contains an example of an application.
Related Work
Our techniques are to some extent related to those of De Santis et al. 10] . The models are quite di erent, however: 10] considers non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of membership, while we consider interactive proofs of knowledge. Also, 10] considers variants of the quadratic residuosity problem, while we consider any problem that a ords a protocol of the right form.
In some recent independent work, De Santis et al. 11] apply techniques similar to ours to proofs of membership in random self-reducible languages. This leads to perfect zero-knowledge proofs for monotone Boolean operations over such languages.
In 4], Feige and Shamir introduce the concepts of witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols and prove the existence of witness hiding protocols for a large class of problems, including the ones we consider (Corollary 4.4). This was done using general zero-knowledge techniques and the assumption that one-way functions exist. Compared to 4], our result shows that if we start from a proof of knowledge with properties as described above, witness hiding protocols can be constructed much more e ciently and without using computational assumptions.
In 3], a transformation from honest veri er zero-knowledge proof was given for protocols including the type we consider. That transformation produced zero-knowledge protocols, but on the other hand greatly increased the communication and round complexity so that, contrary to ours, the practical value of that transformation is quite limited. If the target is zero-knowledge, however, the increased round complexity seems to be unavoidable.
Proofs of Knowledge
Most of our formalism with respect to protocols follows Feige and Shamir 4] , but some of the technicalities have been omitted in this extended abstract.
Our protocols take place between a prover P and a veri er V , both of which are interactive probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines. Both prover and veri er have private auxiliary input tapes. P's auxiliary input is denoted by w. There is a common input x of length k bits (k is sometimes called the security parameter). In the following, a probability is called negligible, if as a function of k, it converges to 0 faster than any polynomial fraction.
The proof system is designed with respect to a binary relation R = f(x; w)g, which can be tested in polynomial time. For any x, its witness set w(x) is the set of w's, such that (x; w) 2 R. The purpose of the protocol is for P to show that it has been given an element of w(x) on its private input tape. We assume that completeness holds with probability 1, i.e. if indeed w 2 w(x), then the veri er always accepts.
As mentioned, we restrict ourselves to three round public coin protocols for simplicity (the three round restriction can be easily removed). Conversations in the protocol will be ordered triples of the form m 1 ; c; m 2 The second message in the protocol is a random bit string c chosen by the veri er. We refer to this as a challenge, and to the prover's nal message as the answer. The length of c is such that the number of possible c-values is super-polynomial in k.
We assume that the protocol satis es knowledge soundness in the following sense: for any prover P , given two conversations between P and V : (m 1 ; c; m 2 ); (m 1 ; c 0 ; m 0 2 ), where c 6 = c 0 , an element of w(x) can be computed in polynomial time. We call this the special soundness property. It is easily seen to imply the standard soundness de nition, which calls for the existence of a knowledge extractor, which can extract a witness in polynomial time from any prover that is successful with non-negligible probability.
Although special soundness is less general than the standard de nition, all known proofs of knowledge have this property, or at least a variant where computation of the witness follows from some small number of correct answers. Assuming special soundness is therefore not a serious restriction.
A protocol which is sound and complete in the above sense is called a proof of knowledge for the relation R.
Finally, we assume that the protocol is honest veri er zero-knowledge: there is a simulator S that on input x produces conversations that are indistinguishable from real conversations with input x between the honest prover and the honest veri er. For simplicity we assume perfect indistinguishability in the following; generalization to other avors of indistinguishability is easy. Most known honest veri er zero-knowledge protocols in fact satisfy something stronger, viz. that there is a procedure that can take any c as input and produce a conversation indistinguishable from the space of all conversations between the honest prover and veri er in which c is the challenge. We call this special honest veri er zero-knowledge.
We will later need the concepts of witness indistinguishable (WI) and witness hiding (WH) protocols, which were introduced in 4]. Informally, a protocol is witness indistinguishable if conversations generated with the same x but di erent elements from w(x) have indistinguishable distributions, i.e. even a cheating veri er cannot tell which witness the prover is using. If the problem instance x is generated with a certain probability distribution by a generator G which outputs pairs (x; w) with w 2 w(x), we can de ne the concept of witness hiding. A protocol is witness hiding over G, if it does not help even a cheating veri er to compute a witness for x with non-negligible probability when the x is generated by G. We refer to 4] for details.
With respect to the witness hiding property, we can already now note the following:
Proposition 1 Let P be a three round public coin proof of knowledge for relation R. If P is honest veri er zero-knowledge, then P is witness indistinguishable. Proof We trivially have WI for conversations with the honest veri er, since conversations generated with any witness will lead to the same distribution as produced by the simulator. But then conversations using di erent witnesses will still have the same distribution if we restrict to conversations with a xed c occurring as the challenge. Since the only di erence between the honest veri er and a general one lies in the distribution with which c is chosen, we get also WI against an arbitrary veri er. 2
In many concrete cases, this proposition is not interesting because there is only one witness, in which case WI is trivial and cannot imply anything. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 will be needed in the following for technical reasons.
An Example
As a concrete example of a protocol with the properties we need, we present Schnorr's protocol from 12] for proving knowledge of a discrete log in a group G of prime order q. Let g 6 = 1, and let x = g w be the common input. P is given w as private input. In the language of the above section, the protocol is a proof of knowledge for the relation that consists of pairs ( (x; g; G); w) such that x = g w in G. Then the protocol works as follows:
1. The prover chooses z at random in 0::q), and sends a = g z to V . 2. The veri er chooses c at random in 0::q), and sends it to P. 3 . P sends r = (z + cw) mod q to V , and V checks that g r = a x c .
Completeness trivially holds with probability 1. Correct answers to two di erent cvalues give two equations r 1 = z + wc 1 mod q and r 2 = z + wc 2 mod q so we nd that w = (r 1 ? r 2 )=(c 1 ? c 2 ) mod q. So special soundness holds also. Finally, note that by choosing c and r at random, we can make a simulated conversation (g r x ?c ; c; r) between the honest veri er and prover. Since c can be chosen freely, we even get special honest veri er zero-knowledge.
Secret Sharing
A secret sharing scheme is a method by which a secret s can be distributed among n participants, by giving a share to each participant. The shares are computed in such a way that some subsets of participants can, by pooling their shares, reconstruct s. These subsets are called quali ed sets. Participants forming a non-quali ed set should be able to obtain no information whatsoever about s. Such a secret sharing scheme is called perfect.
The collection of quali ed sets is called the access structure for the secret sharing scheme. Clearly if participants in some set can reconstruct s, so can any superset, and therefore in order for the scheme to make sense, it must be the case that if A is a quali ed set, then any set containing A is also quali ed. An access structure with this property is called monotone.
A special case of monotone access structures is structures containing all subsets larger than some threshold value. Such structures are called threshold structures.
Any monotone access structure has a natural dual structure. This concept was rst de ned in 14].
De nition 1 Let ? be an access structure containing subsets of a set M. If A M, then A denotes the complement of A in M. Now ? , the dual access structure is de ned as follows:
A 2 ? , A 6 2 ?:
The next propositions follow directly from the de nition.
Proposition 2 The dual ? of a monotone access structure is monotone as well, and satis es (? ) = ?: Furthermore, if ? is a threshold structure, then so is ? .
Proposition 3 Let ? be monotone. A set is quali ed in ? exactly when it has a nonempty intersection with every quali ed set in ? .
In the next section, we will assume we are given a protocol of the form described in Section 2. For each input length k we will assume we are given a monotone access structure ?(k) on n participants, where n = n(k) is polynomially bounded function of k. Thus we have a family of access structures f?(k)j k = 1; 2; : : :g We can then build a new protocol for proving statements on n problem instances provided we have a perfect secret sharing scheme S(k) for ?(k) satisfying certain requirements to be de ned below. Let D(s) denote the joint probability distribution of all shares resulting from distributing the secret s. For any set A of participants, D A (s) denotes the restriction of D(s) to shares in A. As S(k) is perfect, D A (s) is independent from s for any nonquali ed set A. So we will write D A instead of D A (s), whenever A is non-quali ed. The requirements then are:
1. All shares generated in S(k) have length polynomially related to k.
2. Distribution and reconstruction of a secret can be done in time polynomial in k.
3. Given secret s and a full set of n shares, one can test in time polynomial in k that the shares are all consistent with s, i.e. that all quali ed sets of shares determine s as the secret. 4. Given any secret s, a set of shares for participants in a non-quali ed set A (distributed according to D A ) can always be completed to a full set of shares distributed according to D(s) and consistent with s. This completion process can be done in time polynomial in k. 5 . For any non-quali ed set A, the probability distribution D A is such that shares for the participants in A are independent and uniformly chosen.
De nition 2 A perfect secret sharing scheme satisfying requirements 1{4 is called 
For more general families of access structures, the answer to this question depends on whether the parameter n is a constant, or is allowed to increase polynomially as a function of k.
In case n is a constant, there exists a smooth secret sharing scheme for any monotone access structure. For any minimal quali ed set A, we do the following: choose s 1 ; : : : ; s jAj at random under the condition that s 1 s jAj = s, and give one s i to each participant in A. This scheme was rst proposed in 9].
Any quali ed set can reconstruct the secret since it must contain a minimal quali ed set. By monotonicity, no non-quali ed set contains a quali ed one, so the secret cannot be reconstructed by a non-quali ed set. It is easy to check that all properties above are satis ed by this scheme: the size of shares and the work needed in this scheme is linear in k, but the constant involved depends of course on n and on the access structure. However, the number of possible subsets is exponential in n, so for non-constant n this scheme will not necessarily be smooth.
For non-constant n, it is an open question whether there are secret sharing schemes of the kind we need for any sequence of access structures. Benaloh and Leichter 1] have proposed secret sharing schemes for more general access structures de ned by monotone formulae, i.e. Boolean formulae containing only AND and OR operators.
Consider a monotone formula F with n variables. Any subset A of n participants corresponds in a natural way to a set of values of the n variables by assigning a variable to each participant and let each variable be 1 if the corresponding participant is in A and 0 otherwise. We let F(A) be the bit resulting from evaluating F on inputs corresponding to A. Then we can de ne an access structure ? F by A 2 ? F , F(A) = 1
We let F denote the dual formula, which results from replacing in F all AND operators by OR's and vice versa. It is not hard to show the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If F is monotone then ? F is also monotone. Conversely, for any monotone access structure ?, there is a monotone formula F, such that ? = ? F . We have that (? F ) = ? F .
In 1], a generic method is given that, based on any monotone formula F, builds a perfect secret sharing scheme for the access structure ? F . The formula F may contain general threshold operators, in addition to simple AND and OR operations. For a polynomial size formula, it can be shown that the secret sharing scheme from 1] satis es all of the above requirements except possibly requirement 5. This leads to:
A nal comment before we go on to the main result is that we will need to distribute secrets of length t = t(k) bits, where t is polynomially bounded in k. This does not impose any restrictions on S(k) because any secret sharing scheme can distribute secrets of any length by running an appropriate number of copies of the scheme in parallel. We therefore assume that S(k) always distributes secrets of length t. Note that, if n is constant as a function of k, only one access structure and secret sharing scheme are involved.
Main Result
The next theorem describes the construction of a proof of knowledge from a basic proof of knowledge P for a relation R and a family of secret sharing schemes. In the constructed proof of knowledge both prover and veri er are probabilistic polynomial time machines, using the prover and veri er of P, respectively, as subroutines.
For the statement of the result we need some notation. Let ? be an access structure on n participants. Then R ? is a relation de ned by: ((x 1 ; :::; x m ); (w 1 ; :::; w m )) 2 R ?
i all x i 's are of the same length, say, k bits, m = n(k), and the set of indices i for which (x i ; w i ) 2 R corresponds to a quali ed set in ?(k). In a proof of knowledge for relation R ? the prover thus proves to know witnesses to a set of the x i 's corresponding to a quali ed set in ?.
Theorem 1 Let P be a three round public coin, honest veri er zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for relation R, and assume that P has the special soundness property. Let f?(k)g be a family of monotone access structures and let fS(k)g be a family of smooth secret sharing schemes such that the access structure of S(k) is ?(k) . Then there exists a three round public coin, witness indistinghuisable proof of knowledge for relation R ? .
Proof To improve readability we drop in the following the dependency on k from the notation, and write S = S(k), ? = ?(k) and n = n(k). We will distribute secrets of length t in S. If the length of any share resulting from this is larger than t, we will replace P by a number of parallel executions of P to make sure that a challenge is at least as long as any share. 2 Note that this does not violate the honest veri er zeroknowledge nor the special soundness property. A basic idea in the following will be to interpret a challenge as a share. If challenges are longer than shares, we will simply take the rst appropriate number of bits of the challenge to be the corresponding share. If c is a challenge, share(c) will denote the corresponding share.
The following now describes the new protocol: 3 . Consider the set of shares fshare(c i )ji 2 Ag that correspond to the c i from the simulation in Step 1. As A is non-quali ed in ? , requirement 4 guarantees that P can complete these shares to a full set of shares consistent with s. P then forms challenges c i for indices i 2 A, such that share(c i ) equals the share produced in the completion process. This is done by simply copying the bits of the shares and padding with random bits if necessary. In Step 1, S has produced a nal message m i 2 in P for i 2 A. For i 2 A, P knows a witness for x i , and can therefore nd a valid m i 2 for m i 1 and c i by running the prover's algorithm from P. It is clear from the assumptions on S that P and V need only poly-time and access to the prover and veri er of P. It therefore remains to be seen that the protocol is a proof of knowledge and that it is witness indistinguishable.
Completeness is trivially seen to hold by inspection of the protocol. For soundness, assume that some prover P for a given rst message fm i 1 j i = 1; : : : ; ng can answer correctly a non-negligible fraction of the possible choices of s. This means that by rewinding P , we can e ciently get correct answers to two di erent values, say s and s 0 . 3 Let the shares of s and s 0 sent in the protocol be share(c i ) and share(c 0 i ); i = 1; : : : ; n, respectively. Then for every quali ed set B 2 ? , there must be an i 2 B, such that share(c i ) 6 = share(c 0 i ) since otherwise it would follow that s = s 0 . But then we also have that c i 6 = c 0 i and so by assumption on P, we can compute a witness for x i . So P knows a witness in every quali ed set of ? . On account of Proposition 3 the set of witnesses we thus extract is a quali ed set in the access structure ?.
As for witness indistinguishability, we have to show that the distribution of the conversation is independent of which quali ed set A 2 ? the prover uses. First observe that the distribution of each m i 1 depends only on x i and equals the distribution of the prover's rst message in an execution of P with x i as input. This follows from Proposition 1, using that P is honest veri er zero-knowledge. In particular, the joint distribution of the m i 1 's, and hence the veri er's choice of s, is independent of A.
Since the set fshare(c i )g is constructed by completing a set of uniformly distributed shares in a non-quali ed set of S, the joint distribution of the share(c i )'s is simply D(s). Since the c i 's are constructed from the shares by possibly padding with random bits, the joint distribution of the c i 's is independent of A. Finally, Proposition 1 implies that the distribution of each m i 2 depends only on x i ; m i 1 and c i , and is therefore also independent of A.
2
If the secret sharing schemes are ideal, the communication complexity of the protocol in Theorem 1 is at most t bits plus n times that of P. Note that instead of taking several instances of the same proof of knowledge, it is also possible to combine di erent proofs of knowledge. In this way, one may for instance prove knowledge of either a discrete log or an RSA root without revealing which.
Theorem 2 As Theorem 1, but with P special honest veri er zero-knowledge and S(k) semi-smooth.
Proof In this case the protocol from Theorem 1 is changed as follows. In Step 1, the prover uses S to distribute an arbitrary secret, and discards all shares in A. The remaining shares are distributed according to D A . He then runs the special simulator on the corresponding challenges. Note that the completion process can still be performed on account of requirement 4, and as before, the honest prover can counter any challenge s by the veri er. Soundness is proven in the same way as before. Therefore, the modi ed scheme still constitutes a proof of knowledge for relation R ? .
As for witness indistinguishability, we only have to note that the distribution of any m i 1 generated by the (special) simulator is the same for any particular challenge value c i used, because m i 1 in a real execution of P is independent of the challenge. Therefore the joint distribution of the m i 1 's is the same as in the case of Theorem 1. The rest of the proof is therefore the same as for Theorem 1.
2
The witness indistinguishable property of the protocol from Theorem 1 leads us to a generalization of Theorem 4.3 of 4]. To state the result, we need to introduce the concept of an invulnerable generator G for a relation R. Such generators were rst introduced in 6] and later used in slightly modi ed form in 4]. Such a generator is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which outputs a pair (x; w) 2 R. The generator is invulnerable if no probabilistic polynomial time enemy given only x can compute an element in w(x) with non-negligible probability, taken over the coin ips of both G and the enemy.
Thus, asserting the existence of an invulnerable generator for a relation is a way of stating that it is feasible to generate hard, solved instances of the underlying computational problem.
For any generator G, we let G n denote the generator that produces an n-tuple of pairs in R by running G independently n times in parallel. We will also need some notation for access structures: for a monotone access structure ?, we let the sets in ? correspond to subsets of the index set N = f1; :::; ng. Now let the set I ? N be de ned by: i 2 I ? i i is contained in every quali ed set in ?. It is easy to see by monotonicity of ? that i 2 I ? precisely if N n fig is not quali ed.
Theorem 3 Let P be a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge for the relation R ? , where ? = f?(k)g is a family of monotone access structures on n(k) participants, and R is a binary relation. If for all k, ?(k) contains at least two di erent minimal quali ed sets, and there is an invulnerable generator G for R, then P is witness hiding over G n(k) .
Proof We follow the line of reasoning from Thm. 4.3 of 4]. Suppose we are given an probabilistic polynomial time enemy A that has non-negligible probability of computing a witness, using the honest prover in the scheme from Theorem 1 as a subroutine.
We show that A can be compiled into an algorithm that solves with non-negligible probability random instances x generated by G, thus contradicting the invulnerability of the generator (see 4]).
From the assumption on ?(k) = ? (at least two minimal quali ed sets) it follows that N n I ? must contain at least two elements, and that I ? is not quali ed.
Our compilation now works as follows:
1. Determine the set I ? . This can be done by recalling that soundness of P allows the prover to convince the veri er with only negligible probability if the prover only knows witnesses in a non-quali ed set. So for each i, we can use G to generate a set of problem instances and emulate the protocol with N n fig corresponding to the set of known witnesses. If i 2 I ? , then this fails almost always, otherwise it fails with negligible probability. For simplicity, we argue in the following as if this procedure determines the correct I ? with probability 1. Taking into account the small probability of making a mistake introduces only a negligible change in the success probability of our algorithm. 2. Recall that our input is a problem instance x generated by G. We now form an n tuple of instances (x 1 ; :::; x n ) as follows: choose at random j 2 N n I ? (which is non-empty), and let x j = x. For all other indices i, run G to produce a solved instance x i and save the witness w i .
3. Give x 1 ; :::; x n as input to A. When A needs to interact with the prover, we simply simulate the prover's algorithm from Theorem 1. This can be done because we know witnesses of all instances except x j , and the fact that j 6 2 I ? guarantees that N n fjg is quali ed. 4. If A is successful, it outputs a witness for the relation R ? which by de nition is a set of witnesses fw i g corresponding to a quali ed set A in ?. If j 2 A, we have success and can output w j . Else output something random.
We now show that this compilation nds a witness for x with non-negligible probability. First note that the joint distribution of the x i 's we give to A is the same as in an ordinary interaction with the prover. Therefore A is successful with non-negligible probability. We therefore only have to bound the probability that j is in A, the set of witnesses we get from A. Since I ? is not quali ed, A must contain at least one index not in I ? . By witness indistinguishability, A has no information about which j in N n I ? we have chosen, and so the probability that j 2 A is at least 1=jN n I ? j. Hence if A has success probability , we have success probability at least =n, which is non-negligible.
Note that an access structure has at least two minimal quali ed sets exactly when the corresponding minimal CNF-formula contains at least one OR-operator.
Note also that this result only shows that an enemy cannot compute a complete quali ed set of witnesses. It does not rule out that the protocol could help him to compute a small, non-quali ed set. Ideally, we would like to prove that the enemy cannot compute even a single witness. With a stronger assumption on the access structure, this can be done:
Corollary 1 Let P be a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge for the relation R ? , where ? = f?(k)g is a family of monotone access structures on n(k) participants, and R is a binary relation. Suppose that for all k the set I ?(k) is empty. Suppose nally that there is an invulnerable generator G for R, and that inputs for P are generated by G n(k) . Then no probabilistic polynomial time enemy interacting with the honest prover can with non-negligible probability compute a witness for any of the x i in the input to the protocol.
Proof Since I ?(k) is non quali ed, there are at least two minimal sets, and therefore the proof is the same as for Theorem 3, except that it follows from the assumption that the index j is always chosen among all indices. Hence if the enemy outputs at least one correct witness, there is a non-negligible probability of at least 1=n that this is the witness we are looking for.
A certain special case of Theorem 1 is interesting in its own right:
Corollary 2 Assume we have a proof of knowledge P for relation R as described in Section 2. Then for any n; d there is a protocol with the same round complexity as P in which the prover shows that he knows d out of n witnesses without revealing which d witnesses are known. To build the protocol of Corollary 3, we need a 2 out of 2 threshold scheme. Such a scheme can be implemented by choosing random shares c 1 ; c 2 such that c 1 c 2 equals the secret. Therefore, in the simple case of Corollary 3, the protocol constructed by Theorem 1 simply becomes a game where the veri er chooses a random s, and the prover shows that he can answer correctly a pair of challenges c 1 ; c 2 , such that s = c 1 c 2 . In the prover's nal message, he only has to send c 1 because the veri er can then compute c 2 himself. Hence the communication complexity of the new protocol is exactly twice that of P, whence the new protocol is just as practical as P. See also the examples below.
Corollary 4 Let f?(k) = ? F k g be a family of monotone access structure on n(k) participants de ned by a polynomial size family of formulas fF k g, and let P be a proof of knowledge with properties as described in Section 2. Suppose P is special honest veri er zero-knowledge. Then there exists a witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge in which the prover proves that he knows a subset of solutions to n(k) problem instances that is quali ed in ?(k). Let M(k) be the maximal number of occurrences of a variable in F(k). Then the communication complexity of the new protocol is at most nM(k) times that of P plus t bits. Proof By Proposition 2, ?(k) = ? F k , and since the size of F k is the same as that of 
Examples
We present two instances of the general case for threshold structures (cf. Corollary 2), using Schnorr's protocol as the basic proof of knowledge (cf. Section 2.1). As secret sharing schemes we use either Shamir's scheme or the alternative scheme as described The grand total for this scheme is therefore 2nd multiplications. From this we conclude that Shamir's scheme should be used for d > n=2 and that the alternative scheme should be used otherwise.
Application to Identification and Signatures
Suppose we have n users, for example employees of a company, such that the i-th user has a public key x i and secret key w i 2 w(x i ). Suppose also that certain subsets of users are quali ed in the sense that they are allowed to initiate certain actions, sign letters on behalf of the company, etc. This de nes an access structure on the set of users. Theorem 1 now gives a way in which a subset of users can collaborate to identify themselves as a quali ed subset, without revealing anything else about their identities. This makes good sense, if they are to assume responsibility on behalf of the company, rather than personally.
This also extends to digital signatures, since by using a hash function, any three round proof of knowledge as the one produced by Theorem 1 can be turned into a signature scheme by computing the challenge as a hash value of the message to be signed and the prover's rst message (this technique was introduced in 5]). By this method, a signature can be computed which will show that a quali ed subset was present, without revealing which subset was involved. This may be seen as a generalization of the group signature concept, introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst 2] . One aspect of group signatures which is missing here, however, is that it is not possible later to "open" signatures to discover the identities of users involved.
Open Problems
Two obvious open problems remain. First, can Theorem 1 be proved assuming ordinary soundness of P, and not special soundness? We remark that this can be done at the expense of assuming existence of a bit commitment scheme; it is also interesting to note that if one aims at proofs of membership and not proofs of knowledge, special soundness is not needed. A second question is whether Theorem 1 can be generalized to other types of protocols than public coin protocols.
